# Approved For Release 2000/08/30 CIA-RDP80R01443R000300110005-3 NSC BRIEFING 27 October 1954

#### SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

- I. Sudden increase in Soviet efforts improve Yugo relations. Effort, itself, dates from Stalin's death, but heretofore casual:
  - A. June '53, ambassador appointed.
  - B. After that, some Satellites followed suit, also made small trade deals.
  - C. Border incidents down.
  - D. Orbit anti-Yugo propaganda down.
- II. In last weeks, Moscow's approach to Yugo both surprising, new:
  - A. Started (mid-September) use selected quotes from Yugo press, leaders:

    APPEARANCE
    careful give, Yugo support Soviet policy.
  - B. Anti-Tito clandestine radio off air
     (29 Sep); jamming Yugo broadcasts to
     Orbit stopped; anti-Tito books off

shelves in Poland.
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- C. Last week (10th anniv. liberation Belgrade), USSR cheered Yugo partisans-first time since '48 break.
- D. \$5 million deal between Moscow and
  Belgrade trade agencies signed
  1 October. Yugo also agreed to talks
  on more formal trade deal (Orbit trade
  now 5% Yugo total could exceed
  25%, prewar figure).
- E. Soviet "cognizance" Trieste settlement partly reflection desire improve Yugo relations.
- III. Yugos not rejecting these moves:

  position--always willing normalize on
  basis equality.
  - A. Plan exchange Soviet, Yugo movies-would be first cultural propaganda
    interchange in six years.
  - B. Also okayed Soviet commercial overflights to Albania.

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- IV. Tito, other Yugo leaders on record that cooperation with West no bar to improved relations with East. Hold view that "equilibrium...had been created" wherein "East-West conferences" possibly fruitful.
  - A. Tito (16 October) stated will not "go back to Moscow."
  - B. Yugos will continue cooperation with West for defense.
  - C. Yugos approve European unification,
    even German rearmament. But
    simultaneously believe in negotiations
    with USSR, characterize Soviet policy
    of relaxing tension in Europe as
    "permanent."
  - D. Yugos take stand that, as socialist state, cannot join any organization (such as NATO) which primarily anti-Communist.

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- V. Tone of Yugo propaganda on USSR continues ameliorate:
  - A. 10th anniv. speeches still gave most credit to Yugo forces, mentioned

    Soviet-Yugo "quarrels and disagreements."
  - B. Had ceremony at Soviet-Yugo soldier's cemetery, but was "pretty dismal."
- VI. Soviet shift attributed to reevaluation policy toward Yugos, attempt block further Yugo shift West.
  - A. "Normalization" efforts of last year gained little--new moves needed counterbalance such West gains as Balkan alliance, Trieste settlement.
  - B. Gestures fit conciliatory pattern

    Soviet European policy, but also

    Kremlin may think especially productive
    for Communist Yugo; as test

    ''deviationist" regime's responses; as

    preparation future offers; as easy means

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- C. Moscow may plan eventually offer Tito some real bait for shift to East, but no signs yet.
- D. First will continue improve atmosphere.
- VII. Yugo self-interest appears bar return to East.
  - A. Tito now has virtual Western guarantee national security, plus military, economic aid, at no cost to independence, internal autonomy (Soviet control attempts were major cause '48 break).
  - B. Yugos see recent moves (getting out of joint companies, Port Arthur agreement) as Soviet recognition necessity less interference internal affairs other states.
  - C. · However, Tito and leaders still distrustful enough to discount any Soviet

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D. Yugos nonetheless may believe that improved relations with Bloc give leverage in bargaining with West.